Man’s Best Property? Redefining “Immediate Family” in DeBlase v. Hill 

Hannah Shin*

It would be hard to imagine John Wick fighting for emotional damages in a courtroom after losing his dog.¹ Devastated pet owners in the real world, however, have a different weapon of choice: the courthouse. A New York judge’s ruling continues the conversation of whether emotional harm, not just market value, could drive damages in the realm of pet-loss lawsuits. While some state statutes and rulings allow noneconomic damages, the DeBlase v. Hill decision walks a slightly different, but very narrow line, exploring the legal definition of “immediate family” and the challenges of stare decisis.

On July 4, 2023, Nan DeBlase was walking her son Trevor’s dog, Duke, on a leash across a Brooklyn crosswalk.² Mitchell Hill ran a stop sign, made an illegal turn, and struck and killed Duke.³ Nan, still tethered to the dog, witnessed the impact firsthand.⁴

Both Nan and Trevor sued Hill for negligent infliction of emotional distress, among other claims.⁵ The trial court held Nan could pursue emotional distress damages because she was physically within the zone of danger.⁶ Trevor, who was not present, was limited to property-type damages.⁷ The court emphasized that its holding rested on the very specific set of facts, confining recovery to those personally endangered while witnessing the harm.⁸

The New York Court of Appeals has not recognized emotional distress recovery for the negligent death of an animal. Thus, the trial court judge turned in part to Greene v. Esplanade Venture Partnership.⁹ The Court of Appeals held in Greene that a grandmother who helped raise her granddaughter qualified as “immediate family” under the zone of danger doctrine based on a few factors.¹⁰ These factors were “used to determine whether the grandmother would be considered ‘immediate family,’ including legal recognition of the special status of grandparents, shifting societal norms, and common sense.”¹¹ 

The boldest move in DeBlase was its adaptation of a human-focused doctrine to a non-human family member. Traditionally, New York courts confine immediate family to parents, children, spouses, and sometimes grandparents.¹² Extending that label to a dog—even one treated as a family member—marks a doctrinal innovation.  

The trial judge recognized, however, that there are shifts in both legal and societal norms which affect this decision.¹³ By recognizing Nan’s emotional bond as qualifying under the Greene factors, the court implicitly acknowledged what many households already accept: that the human-animal bond can carry the same emotional weight as kinship.  

Most states that let you recover anything beyond a pet’s market value have done so through statute.¹⁴ Tennessee’s T-Bo Act allows up to $5,000 in noneconomic damages for the death of a pet.¹⁵ Illinois permits emotional distress damages only in cases of aggravated cruelty or negligence with bad faith.¹⁶ Other states, like California in Plotnik v. Meihause, allow emotional distress damages for intentional or malicious injury to a pet.¹⁷ 

By contrast, DeBlase creates a judicial carve-out, without a statutory cap. Without the legislative ceiling, defendants and insurers face potentially large and unpredictable verdicts. DeBlase pushes further, allowing recovery for emotional distress specifically in a negligence context, rather than an intentional tort context. This case thus bridges two worlds: the common law reluctance to value emotion in property cases and society’s evolving view of animals as family.  

Even as it expands doctrine, however, DeBlase draws boundaries. The court denied Trevor’s claim because he was absent from the scene.¹⁸ Emotional harm alone, untethered from physical peril, remains unrecoverable. The court emphasized that its holding rested on a very specific set of facts, confining recovery to those personally endangered while witnessing the harm.¹⁹ The court carefully avoided opening the floodgates. Its analysis turned on the physical tether—the leash—that placed Nan herself in danger, paired with the dangers of a motor vehicle.²⁰ Absent that peril, emotional distress alone would not suffice.  

Because DeBlase is a trial-level decision, it has limited precedential value. The case is up for appeal, and its survival will determine whether New York cements or retreats from this nascent recognition of pets as quasi-family under tort law.²¹ If affirmed, DeBlase could become one of the first appellate decisions to treat a dog as immediate family within the zone of danger doctrine. If reversed, it would underscore the judiciary’s reluctance to legislate empathy from the bench.  

DeBlase v. Hill reflects a quiet evolution in tort law: the willingness of courts to test old doctrines against modern values. While legislatures like Tennessee’s and Illinois’s have drawn clear statutory lines, New York’s trial court dared to redraw one of its own, acknowledging that some bonds transcend property, even when the law has yet to catch up.  

*Hannah Shin, J.D./M.B.A. Candidate, University of St. Thomas School of Law Class of 2028 (Associate Editor).

1. John Wick, Hulu (Summit Entertainment 2014). ↩︎
2. DeBlase v. Hill, 239 N.Y.S.3d 770, 774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2025).  ↩︎
3. Id. ↩︎
4. Id. ↩︎
5. Id. at 773.  ↩︎
6. Id. at 793.  ↩︎
7. Id. at 793–94.  ↩︎
8. Id. at 792.  ↩︎
9. Id. at 789–90.  ↩︎
10. Id. at 789. ↩︎
11. Id. at 789. ↩︎
12. Id.  ↩︎
13. Id.; see Feger v. Warwick Animal Shelter, 59 A.D.3d 68, 72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2008); see also N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236 (B)(5)(d)(15)(McKinney 2024); see also Nonhuman Rights Project Inc. v. Breheny, 38 N.Y.3d 555, 606 (N.Y. 2022) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“domesticated pets have become important members of families, and the law has accounted for the role they play in people’s lives.”). ↩︎
14. See Angie Vega, Overview of Pet/Companion Animal Damages, Animal Legal & Hist. Ctr. (2022), https://www.animallaw.info/intro/petcompanion-animal-damages [https://perma.cc/T444-CV8K]. ↩︎
15. T-Bo Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 44-17-403 (West 2025). ↩︎
16. 510 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 70/16.3 (West 2025). ↩︎
17. Plotnik v. Meihaus, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). ↩︎
18. DeBlase, 239 N.Y.S.3d at 793–94. ↩︎
19. Id. at 791. ↩︎
20. Id. at 793. ↩︎
21. New York Judge Declares Dog an Immediate Family Member, Am. Veterinary Med. Ass’n (July 11, 2025), https://www.avma.org/blog/new-york-judge-declares-dog-immediate-family-member [https://perma.cc/Z6VJ-TVWA]. ↩︎