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“No Genuine Dispute”: The Origin, Rise, and Effect of Summary Judgment

Asher Z. Introlegator*

I recently had a conversation with a colleague who formerly clerked at a collections firm. During our discussion, he informed me that attorneys at that firm would move for summary judgment at the close of discovery. The motion was virtually always granted. We laughed because it sounded ridiculous in practice. But that was the point: “Summary judgment procedure is a method for promptly disposing of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.”1 If you didn’t pay your debts and the documents show that, there’s no reasonable basis to deny it. No reasonable finder of fact could find to the contrary. It’s a great example of how this ubiquitous device works. After all, every law student knows what summary judgment is. But little did I know that this creditor-debtor scenario is, in fact, why summary judgment exists.2

As much of a staple as summary judgment is now, law students one to two generations ago could hardly have imagined how profound an effect it would have.3 Federal trial rates have collapsed since the mid-1980s.4 And despite this, it originally started as something much narrower; Keating’s Act, passed by the UK Parliament in 1855, allowed the use of summary judgment in creditor-debtor cases involving bills of exchange.5 Parliament expanded its application to other creditor-debtor disputes in the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875.6 By 1933, it applied to virtually all civil actions in England.7

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure first embraced summary judgment in 1938.8 It was applicable to all civil actions.9 Nevertheless, during its first forty years in the Federal Rules, “it was common to see statements to the effect that summary judgment was disfavored, and courts accordingly set quite a high bar for granting relief.”10 The United States Supreme Court displayed this attitude in Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co.11 There, the Court held that the moving party bore the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.12 In other words, the moving party had to do more than point to a dearth of evidence in the nonmovant’s case. At least, that is how lower courts interpreted it.13

But in 1986, everything changed. That year, the Supreme Court handed down its “trilogy” of decisions that still underpin the summary judgment standard to this day: Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,14 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,15 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.16 For a first-person, anecdotal perspective on this, I inquired with my Applied Civil Procedure professor, Steve Lucke. Steve practiced at Dorsey & Whitney from 1984 until 2023.17 He recounted the following story:

One day early in my career, I was preparing to argue my first motion in federal district court. It was a motion for summary judgment before Judge Diana Murphy in the District of Minnesota. Coincidentally, that day I was also working my way through advance sheets that contained recent court opinions that West Publishing would periodically circulate to its subscribers before publication of the hardbound reporter volumes—paperwork that all litigation associates at my firm were expected to keep up with. I noticed that several of the new opinions included Supreme Court summary judgment decisions. I read them especially carefully, hoping they would illuminate the rules [of] summary judgment that I would need to have down pat for the hearing.

The next day at oral argument I referenced the standard for summary judgment from the Supreme Court authority I found in the advance sheets, but Judge Murphy expressed skepticism. After the argument was over and I was heading toward the elevator, Judge Murphy’s law clerk (who I knew from my own clerking days) caught up with me and asked the name of the case that I had just cited. The case, I told her, was Celotex v. Catrett—completely oblivious to the possibility that this authority and the other trilogy cases reflected any kind of change in the law. The trilogy, of course, was the foundation for summary judgment practice for the remainder of my career.18

Steve’s story illustrates two points. First, the switch among lower courts likely was not instantaneous. That is not hard to imagine in an age of paper advance sheets, but it is also fascinating that even a federal judge expressed skepticism that the standard for summary judgment had changed. Second, this story suggests that few at the time grasped how radically the trilogy decisions would remake the federal civil courts in the United States.

And indeed, remake them it did. The data on civil trials in federal district courts paints an astonishing picture. In 1962, federal courts disposed of 50,320 cases.19 Of those dispositions, 5,802 (11.5%) were trials.20 Federal trials peaked in 1985, with 12,529 (4.7%) of cases going to trial.21 The peak did not reflect a higher trial rate; there were simply more cases that year. After the trilogy, the numbers began to fall.22 In the twelve months ending June 30, 1990, 9,263 (4.3%) of cases went to trial.23 In 2025, that number was down to 1,681 (0.4%).24

As the trite but true maxim goes, correlation is not causation. Certainly, some scholars tie the trilogy directly to the evaporation of civil trials.25 Nevertheless, as common as summary judgment is, it has its critics. Some argue that it is not a neutral tool and that its use adversely affects litigants bringing civil rights and employment discrimination claims.26 Others argue it is outright unconstitutional.27

I think summary judgment has an important and causal role in the decline of trials. But when I asked Steve Lucke whether he could personally perceive the decline in trials as his career progressed, he made an astute point.28 He said yes, but did not necessarily attribute it to summary judgment.29 Specifically, he wrote, “[T]he significant factors behind the decrease in trials include courts’ increased willingness to grant motions to dismiss on the pleadings . . . ; Daubert motion practice that limited expert testimony; greater client sensitivity to litigation costs and risk; and a growing availability of alternative dispute resolution options.”30

Effects and reasons aside, the rise of summary judgment in and of itself is remarkable. It began as a narrow creditor’s remedy.31 Far are we from the days of Victorian England and its prison hulks floating on the waters.32 Now summary judgment sits among the most consequential devices in American civil procedure.


* Asher Z. Introlegator, J.D. Candidate, University of St. Thomas School of Law Class of 2027 (Publications Editor).

  1. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption. ↩︎
  2. See id. (“In England [summary judgment] was first employed only in cases of liquidated claims . . . .”); see also John A. Bauman, The Evolution of the Summary Judgment Procedure: An Essay Commemorating the Centennial Anniversary of Keating’s Act, 31 Ind. L.J. 329, 329 (1956) (describing Keating’s Act as “providing a summary judgment procedure to facilitate the collection of bills of exchange”). ↩︎
  3. See infra text accompanying note 18; see also Diane P. Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 36 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 231, 240 (2011) (observing that after the 1986 trilogy, “[s]ummary judgment became the focal point of litigation, rather than a rarely used device to dispose of particularly weak cases”). ↩︎
  4. See Table 4.10—U.S. District Courts–Civil Judicial Facts and Figures, U.S. Cts. (Sep. 30, 2025), https://www.uscourts.gov/data-news/data-tables/2025/09/30/judicial-facts-and-figures/410 [https://perma.cc/X5SN-YE5V] [hereinafter Table 4.10] (reporting that 0.4 percent of civil cases terminated in fiscal year 2025 reached trial, down from 4.3 percent in 1990); see also Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459, 461 (2004) (finding that the number of federal civil trials peaked in 1985 and then fell by more than 60 percent). ↩︎
  5. Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67 (Eng.); see also Bauman, supra note 2, at 334–39 (tracing Lord Brougham’s proposals to import Scotland’s “summary diligence” for bills of exchange and Parliament’s enactment of Keating’s competing bill instead). ↩︎
  6. Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 (Eng.); Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875, 38 & 39 Vict. c. 77 (Eng.); see Bauman, supra note 2, at 339 & nn.80–82 (explaining that rules adopted under the Judicature Acts “extended the summary judgment procedure incorporated in Order XIV to actions for debts and liquidated sums of money”). ↩︎
  7. See Bauman, supra note 2, at 340 (noting that in 1933 the procedure was extended “to include all actions in the Queen’s Bench division” except libel, slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction, breach of promise of marriage, and fraud actions); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption (describing “a steady enlargement of the scope of the remedy” in England until it reached “all other actions at law, for liquidated or unliquidated claims, except for a few designated torts and breach of promise of marriage”). ↩︎
  8. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption; Wood, supra note 3, at 235 (“[W]hen the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect in 1938, they included a provision for summary judgment in Rule 56.”). ↩︎
  9. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption (“This rule is applicable to all actions . . . .”); see also Wood, supra note 3, at 235 (noting that, “unlike the various state summary procedures, the federal rule was not limited to any particular type of action”). ↩︎
  10. Wood, supra note 3, at 238; see also id. at 238 & nn.24–26 (discussing Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946)). Many thanks to Professor Michael Stokes Paulsen for requiring his stooges students (myself included) to read Arnstein in his 1L Civil Procedure course. Cf. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 467 (“Plaintiff said that defendant ‘had stooges right along to follow me, watch me, and live in the same apartment with me,’ and that plaintiff’s room had been ransacked on several occasions.”); id. at 469 (“Although part of plaintiff’s testimony on deposition (as to ‘stooges’ and the like) does seem ‘fantastic,’ yet plaintiff’s credibility, even as to those improbabilities, should be left to the jury.”). ↩︎
  11. 398 U.S. 144 (1970); see Wood, supra note 3, at 239 (describing Adickes as displaying the Court’s “attitude toward summary judgment”). ↩︎
  12. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 157 (“As the moving party, respondent had the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact . . . .”). ↩︎
  13. See id. at 157, 160 (holding summary judgment improper because the movant failed “to foreclose the possibility that there was a policeman in the Kress store,” and reasoning that “summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note to 1963 amendment)); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321–22, 325 (1986) (describing the court of appeals’ reading of Adickes to require the movant to produce evidence negating the nonmovant’s claim, and rejecting that reading). ↩︎
  14. 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (holding that the nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”). ↩︎
  15. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (holding that a factual dispute is “genuine” only “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party”). ↩︎
  16. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 327 (holding that Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” and calling summary judgment “an integral part of the Federal Rules” rather than “a disfavored procedural shortcut”). ↩︎
  17. Stephen P. Lucke, Esq., JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/neutrals/lucke [https://perma.cc/6533-G8KU] (last visited Oct. 13, 2026) (listing “Trial Partner and Associate, Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, 1984–2023”). ↩︎
  18. E-mail from Stephen P. Lucke, Adjunct Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of L., to author (Oct. 10, 2026, at 00:47 CT) (on file with author) [hereinafter Lucke E-mail]. As a postscript, Steve adds: “Judge Murphy subsequently was appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. She was instrumental in founding the University of St. Thomas School of Law and served on its original board of governors. Her law clerk, Margaret Chutich, later became a justice on the Minnesota Supreme Court and has likewise served as a member (and chair) of the law school’s board of governors.” Id. ↩︎
  19. Galanter, supra note 4, at 462 tbl.1. ↩︎
  20. Id. ↩︎
  21. Id. at 461; see also id. at 534 tbl.A-2 (reporting 268,070 dispositions and 12,529 trials in fiscal year 1985). ↩︎
  22. See id. at 461 (noting that from the 1985 peak, “the number of trials in federal court has dropped by more than 60 percent”); see also Jeffrey Q. Smith & Grant R. MacQueen, Going, Going, but Not Quite Gone: Trials Continue to Decline in Federal and State Courts. Does It Matter?, 101 Judicature 26, 33 (2017) (“Many commentators identify 1986 as a pivotal year . . . .”). ↩︎
  23. Table 4.10, supra note 4 (reporting 9,263 trials, or 4.3 percent of terminations, for the twelve months ending June 30, 1990). ↩︎
  24. Id. (reporting 1,681 trials, or 0.4 percent of terminations, for fiscal year 2025). ↩︎
  25. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 982, 984 (2003) (arguing that the trilogy “transformed summary judgment from an infrequently granted procedural device”); Smith & MacQueen, supra note 22, at 33 (“The message was clearly heard by the lower courts, as dispositions by summary judgment increased significantly thereafter.”); Wood, supra note 3, at 241 (observing that “the ‘pretrial’ stage resolved 98% of cases and trials nearly vanished” and that “[s]ummary judgment played a major role in this evolution”). But see Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 591, 620 (2004) (“Such reliable empirical evidence as we have . . . does not support the claims of those who see a turning point in the Supreme Court’s 1986 trilogy.”). ↩︎
  26. See, e.g., Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 Yale L.J. Online 109, 110, 113–14 (2012) (arguing that because judges write decisions chiefly when employment discrimination plaintiffs lose at summary judgment, the resulting body of law skews against those plaintiffs); see also Galanter, supra note 4, at 468 & n.14 (noting “the readiness of courts to grant summary judgment” in civil rights cases). ↩︎
  27. See, e.g., Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 Va. L. Rev. 139, 140 (2007) (“Summary judgment is unconstitutional.”). ↩︎
  28. See E-mail from author to Stephen P. Lucke, Adjunct Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of L. (Oct. 7, 2026, at 11:37 CT) (on file with author) (asking whether, over his career, he saw “the point at which cases were effectively decided move earlier, i.e., away from trial and toward summary judgment”). ↩︎
  29. Lucke E-mail, supra note 18 (“[O]ver time I observed fewer cases going to trial, but I would not necessarily attribute that change to legal developments that further eased the path to summary judgment.”). ↩︎
  30. Id.; accord Smith & MacQueen, supra note 22, at 33–34 (attributing the decline in trials in part to heightened pleading standards, closer judicial gatekeeping of expert testimony, expensive discovery, and the growth of alternative dispute resolution). ↩︎
  31. See supra notes 2, 5 and accompanying text. ↩︎
  32. Cf. Charles Dickens, Great Expectations 18 (Edgar Rosenberg ed., W. W. Norton & Co. 1999) (1861) (“Hulks are prison-ships . . . . People are put in the Hulks because they murder, and because they rob, and forge, and do all sorts of bad . . . .”). ↩︎

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